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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 Appellants, John P. Armbruster et al. (Armbruster 
Group),0 seek reversal of an order granting summary judgment in 
favor of appellee, Unisys Corporation (Unisys), on their claim of 
age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).0   The 
Armbruster Group consists of fourteen Unisys employees who were 
terminated in February 1991 in the course of a reduction-in-force 
(RIF) at Unisys.  The Armbruster Group claims Unisys targeted 
them for termination because of their age and sought to mask its 
illegal discrimination by selecting them for a new work group the 
company created for older persons it intended to terminate. 
Unisys then fired them almost immediately after the formation of 
the new group, ostensibly because the group had no work. 
                     
0The fourteen appellants making up the Armbruster Group are John 
Armbruster, Shirish K. Divecha, James G. Dodson, Jon E. Kinard, 
William D. Miller, William N. Moritz, John Patton, Jerome I. 
Robin, Edward L. Showalter, Thomas C. Stevens, James Turner, 
Michael J. Yagley, William P. Yanan and Basil Iwashyna. 
0The district court also entered summary judgment in favor of 
Unisys on the Armbruster Group's claim that Unisys terminated 
them to limit their pension benefits in violation of section 510 
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 
U.S.C.A. § 1140 (West 1985).  The Armbruster Group does not raise 
this issue in its brief on appeal and therefore we will not 
consider it. 
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 On appeal the Armbruster Group contends they produced 
evidence sufficient to show what is commonly referred to as a 
"mixed motives" age discrimination case by introducing overt 
evidence of discriminatory animus of the kind Justice O'Connor 
described in her concurrence in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 
S. Ct. 1775 (1989).0  They also contend that the district court 
should not have granted summary judgment because it failed to 
view the evidence of pretext in the light most favorable to them, 
made its own credibility determinations, ignored evidential facts 
as well as reasonable inferences arising from them and 
                     
0The Armbruster Group also argues section 107(a) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), codified at 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2000e-2(m) (West Supp. 1994), applies retroactively to entitle 
them to a liability finding once they prove age was a "motivating 
factor" in the employment decisions surrounding their transfer 
into and termination from the new work group. 
 
    The parties failed to brief the question whether section 
107(a) applies to ADEA as well as Title VII actions.  Even if it 
applied to ADEA, we believe section 107(a) would not govern pre-
enactment conduct.  In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 62 U.S.L.W. 
4255 (U.S. 1994) and Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 62 U.S.L.W. 
4271 (U.S. 1994), the United States Supreme Court held sections 
102 and 101, respectively, are not retroactive.  Section 102 
imposes additional liability for compensatory and punitive 
damages when a violation of Title VII has been shown.  The Court 
looked to the text of the amendments and the legislative history 
and concluded there was no expression of Congressional intent to 
apply section 101 or section 102 retroactively.  Therefore, they 
could not receive retroactive application because they altered 
the extent of a party's liability.  Landgraf, 62 U.S.L.W. at 
4266-67.  To prevail, the Armbruster Group would have to persuade 
us that section 107(a) did not alter the standard of causation 
and the extent of liability by removing an employer's complete 
Price Waterhouse defense that it would have taken the same 
employment action based on a nondiscriminatory consideration. See 
H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 45, 48-49, 
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 586-87 (legislative history 
of 1991 Act); see also infra n.14.  We will not decide that issue 
absent full briefing. 
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incorrectly excluded as hearsay an alleged discriminatory 
statement made by a Unisys manager. 
 We hold that the district court correctly concluded the 
Armbruster Group's evidence of discrimination does not make out a 
Price Waterhouse case.  We also hold, however, that the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment against the Armbruster 
Group because the circumstantial evidence present on this record, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Armbruster Group, 
leaves a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Unisys's 
proffered explanation for its termination of the members of the 
group was a pretext for discrimination.0 
 
II.  Factual History 
 Unisys was created in late 1986 after the merger of the 
Sperry and Burroughs Corporations.  It then employed more than 
120,000 people.  During 1989, 1990 and 1991, Unisys encountered 
severe financial difficulties and, in those years, suffered 
losses of about $746 million, $551 million and $1 billion 
dollars.  By November 1, 1992, Unisys's workforce had been 
reduced by half to about 60,000.  The members of the Armbruster 
                     
0On appeal, the Armbruster Group also contends, for the first 
time, that Unisys's criteria for selection of the new work group 
had a disparate impact on members of the protected class and 
Unisys failed to introduce any evidence of business necessity 
that could justify this discriminatory act.  Whether a disparate 
impact theory of liability is even available under ADEA has yet 
to be addressed by the Supreme Court.  See Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 
1706.  In any event, because the district court has not yet 
addressed this issue, we think it would be inappropriate for us 
to consider it.  See Frank v. Colt Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 100 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
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Group had worked for either Sperry or Burroughs before the merger 
and, at the time of their termination, averaged almost twenty-
five years of service. 
 The specific facts material to this case began to 
unfold in the summer of 1990.  Gerald Gagliardi (Gagliardi), a 
Unisys Vice President, then headed an organization within Unisys 
that was known as Customer Technical Services (CTS).  Unisys 
organized CTS in 1989 so that Unisys employees, rather than non-
Unisys third party vendors, could provide post-sale service and 
support to customers.  Its goal was to unify four different 
divisions within Unisys and eliminate a $150 million loss that 
Gagliardi believed was caused by a loose practice of hiring third 
party vendors to perform project management and evaluate and bid 
large software projects.  Until CTS was formed, each of Unisys's 
four divisions performed these functions separately. 
 Gagliardi began to organize a group within CTS to 
provide project management for all four Unisys divisions.  It 
came to be known as the CTS Project Management Organization 
(CTS/PMO).  Gagliardi did not have a formal business plan for 
this project but believed, from his own observations, that a 
demand for project management existed in all four Unisys 
divisions.  Gagliardi first commandeered twelve men managed by 
Robert Johnson (Johnson) from an existing project management 
organization within Unisys's Systems Management Group (SMG), 
placing Johnson in charge. 
 In early November of 1990, four or five more people 
were transferred into the CTS/PMO at Gagliardi's direction.  At 
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his deposition, Johnson testified that Gagliardi personally 
identified the transferees for him and did not give him an 
opportunity to reject them.  Johnson testified he immediately 
became concerned because there was not enough project management 
work for his twelve man SMG group, let alone the added 
transferees. 
 Gagliardi, however, continued to believe even more 
project managers would be needed to do the anticipated surge of 
work for the new CTS/PMO organization and so he asked David 
Wedean (Wedean), Vice President of Applications Development and 
Central Support Services at both Unisys's Atlanta, Georgia and 
Radnor, Pennsylvania offices, to select persons within Unisys who 
would be capable of performing project management work.  Wedean 
contacted Atlanta site manager Michael Sacco (Sacco) and Radnor 
site manager Margaret Ryan (Ryan) and asked them to identify PMO 
candidates using three criteria:  (1) persons who had actual 
project management experience or otherwise showed the skills and 
experience needed to perform the work; (2) persons underutilized 
in their present positions; and (3) persons whose transfer would 
be least disruptive to their present organization. 
 The parties disagree on who actually selected the 
employees to be transferred into the CTS/PMO, and there is scant 
evidence in the record on this issue.  Some deposition testimony, 
however, does support the Armbruster Group's contention that 
Gagliardi was involved in the selection of who was to be 
transferred into the CTS/PMO.  See Joint Appendix (Jt. App.) at 
A-19, A-759-60.  It is clear that Sacco and Ryan met with Wedean, 
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Johnson and Frank Haslam (Haslam), Director of Human Resources 
for CTS, in November 1990 to review a list of transferees that 
had been prepared.  According to Johnson, the decision on who was 
going to be transferred into the CTS/PMO had already been made; 
he reviewed the list only "[t]o just understand who the people 
were . . . [i]dentify the people, verify where they were coming 
from, and who should announce to them initially that this was 
taking place; that kind of thing."  Jt. App. at A-762.  Johnson 
testified he did not request additional people for his group, had 
nothing to do with the selection of CTS/PMO candidates and simply 
acquiesced in Gagliardi's desire to place additional persons in 
the CTS/PMO.  Wedean also testified that, as they reviewed the 
list with Johnson, Johnson relied on Ryan's and Sacco's opinions 
because Johnson did not know any of the individuals. 
 By late November 1990, approximately forty Unisys 
employees were transferred into the CTS/PMO group based in Blue 
Bell, Pennsylvania.0  Many of them met with Johnson that very 
afternoon after their supervisors had told them about the 
transfer.  During this introductory meeting, Johnson explained 
the nature and goals of the CTS/PMO.  According to one Armbruster 
Group member, Johnson stated Unisys was "pulling senior people 
together to do it."  Jt. App. at A-171. 
 Another smaller group of thirty-five individuals was 
brought into an Atlanta based CTS/PMO to make up the CTS/PMO's 
                     
0It is not clear from the record whether all of the 40 Unisys 
employees came from Unisys's Radnor office or whether some were 
from other Unisys offices, such as Atlanta. 
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full complement.  Armbruster Group member James Turner (Turner), 
who was the Director of the General Accounting Applications 
Business Unit in Atlanta before he was transferred into the Blue 
Bell CTS/PMO, testified that the Atlanta transferees were not 
told of the transfer until the day it occurred and that Wedean 
instructed Sacco and others to have the Atlanta transferees move 
their belongings out of their offices and to deactivate their 
badges immediately because Wedean was concerned that the 
transferees might damage the office if they had access to it over 
the weekend.0 
 The CTS/PMO began functioning officially on December 1, 
1990.  Johnson did not give the transferees any assignments from 
then until their termination nearly three months later, even 
though they repeatedly requested work.  Although the transferees 
had nothing to do, Johnson discouraged them from completing 
projects they had worked on with their former organizations 
because those projects were "not . . . project management kind[s] 
of task[s]."  Jt. App. at A-773.  Johnson admitted it was his 
responsibility, along with his field personnel, to find work for 
the transferees.  He did not remember any new personnel receiving 
any assignments. 
 As the transferees were arriving at the Blue Bell 
facility only three offices were available and they were assigned 
                     
0All 35 Atlanta CTS/PMO transferees were terminated on 
February 26, 1991.  Three brought suit against Unisys alleging 
age discrimination under ADEA and the district court granted 
summary judgment against them.  See Meeker v. Unisys Corp., Civ. 
No. 1:92-CV-246-ODE (N.D. Ga. May 11, 1993), appeal dismissed, 
No. 93-8777 (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 1994).   
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on a first-come, first-served basis.  All but the first three 
transferees were assigned to cubicles.  Johnson's office and his 
SMG group were separated from the transferees by a partition. 
Most of the transferees were not provided with computers and they 
were not allowed to bring computers with them from their old 
Unisys offices.  "Manager Phones" (telephones with speakers) were 
taken away and replaced with regular phones.  The transferees 
received only one and a half days of general CTS training, but 
they were allowed to attend in-house courses and training upon 
their own initiative when any were available.  They never 
received business cards, although Johnson testified he intended 
to provide them. 
 Shortly after the official start of CTS/PMO operations 
in early December 1990, Gagliardi was promoted and transferred to 
another Unisys organization.  On January 1, 1991, James Lee 
Hillberg (Hillberg) replaced Gagliardi as Vice President and 
General Manager of CTS.  Hillberg's job was to make CTS 
profitable as quickly as possible.  When Hillberg met with 
Johnson, he learned that the productivity of Johnson's original 
twelve man SMG group was very low and that the transferees had no 
work at all.  Hillberg instructed Johnson to prepare a forecast 
of Unisys's needs for project management work by region.  On 
January 7, 1991, Johnson sent a memorandum to all regional CTS 
Vice Presidents requesting a forecast of project manager work for 
1991.  The responses showed a level of demand that was less than 
anticipated and Hillberg decided on an immediate reduction-in-
force (RIF) because the number of employees in the CTS/PMO 
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greatly exceeded the number needed to perform the work 
anticipated.  Hillberg testified, however, "[t]here was never any 
discussion of totally eliminating [the SMG] group."  Jt. App. at 
A-825. 
 Hillberg directed Johnson and Haslam to select criteria 
appropriate for identifying individuals for the RIF.  Johnson 
produced a Staff Adjustment Analysis (Analysis) listing each of 
the RIF candidates, their job title, social security number, date 
of hire, age, race and sex, among other things.  Attached to the 
Analysis was a chart entitled "Skills/Experience Matrix" which 
listed each RIF candidate's current project assignment, project 
management experience, related experience and other related 
background. 
 In his Analysis, Johnson concluded the forecasted 
workload required only fifteen project managers and identified 
the fifteen most qualified for retention.  Those slated for 
retention included all of the SMG group and three transferees. 
After reviewing Johnson's Analysis, Hillberg decided to keep only 
twelve project managers and asked Johnson to eliminate three more 
persons from the retention list.  From the group of fifteen, 
Johnson selected the four with the least project management 
experience and retained the oldest, age 54.  Hillberg, Haslam and 
a Unisys attorney reviewed and approved Johnson's proposed 
terminations.  Ultimately all but one of the CTS/PMO transferees 
were terminated and all of Johnson's SMG group were retained. 
Only two of those retained were less than 40 years of age. 
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 On February 26, 1991, Johnson met with the Blue Bell 
project managers selected for the RIF and announced their 
immediate termination.  The human resources department circulated 
their resumes within Unisys and found positions for some, but not 
all.  Among those terminated were the employees in the Armbruster 
Group.  After the RIF, Johnson's SMG group continued to do 
complex project management work.  More routine project management 
work was handled by CTS's regional field organizations.  No 
additional personnel were hired or transferred into the 
centralized CTS/PMO after the terminations in February 1991. 
 Armbruster Group member Yanan was out on disability 
leave when he was officially transferred into the CTS/PMO and 
when the other transferees were later terminated.  When he 
returned to work in March of 1991 he reported to Johnson in Blue 
Bell.  Three days later, Weimer, the human resource 
representative assigned to the Blue Bell CTS/PMO, terminated him. 
During conversations with Weimer, Yanan says Weimer and he 
discussed the reasons for the transferees' terminations and 
Weimer told Yanan the transferees "should have seen the writing 
on the wall" because they were not told anything for three 
months.  Jt. App. at A-655.  Weimer also is said to have stated 
sarcastically, "Gagliardi wouldn't do that, would he?" in 
response to Yanan's questioning whether age was the reason for 
the terminations.  Jt. App. at A-662. 
 
III.  Procedural History 
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 The Armbruster Group filed suit against Unisys in the 
district court on September 20, 1991, alleging:  (1) their 
selection for and layoff from the CTS/PMO violated ADEA; and (2) 
Unisys terminated them to prevent or limit their pension benefits 
in violation of ERISA.0   The district court granted Unisys's 
motion for summary judgment. 
 In its opinion the district court first concluded that 
the Armbruster Group's evidence failed to make out a Price 
Waterhouse case.  In so concluding, the court considered several 
pieces of evidence which the Armbruster Group contended showed an 
overt discriminatory animus.  It first considered age-related 
comments allegedly made by Robert Markell (Markell), a Unisys 
Vice President who resigned in August of 1990, and a 1988 comment 
by Doyle Perry (Perry), President of Unisys's Public Sector 
Division.  Markell's statements were allegedly made at an 
April 19, 1990 meeting to discuss labor costs at Unisys's Radnor 
offices.  Armbruster Group members Armbruster and Iwashnya, who 
were in attendance, claim Markell stated Unisys could not "afford 
to keep people over 50 and 50," meaning those over 50 years of 
age who were earning over $50,000.00 annually.  Armbruster v. 
Unisys Corp., Civ. A. Nos. 91-5948, 92-1402, 1993 WL 93975, at *8 
(E.D. Pa. March 24, 1993).  The district court decided this 
statement was inadmissible double hearsay under Federal Rules of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) and 805 because the Armbruster Group could 
not identify the individual members of upper management for whom 
                     
0Basil Iwashyna filed a similar complaint against Unisys on 
March 6, 1992.  The district court consolidated the actions. 
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Markell was speaking and so qualify the statement as an admission 
by a party opponent.  Markell did not know whether the persons 
who made the statement had anything to do with CTS/PMO employment 
decisions.  Markell left Unisys four months before creation of 
the CTS/PMO and there was no evidence to show that Markell 
himself was involved in any of the CTS/PMO decisionmaking. 
 The court also considered a series of Unisys documents 
that the Armbruster Group offered as overt evidence of 
discriminatory animus.  The Armbruster Group contended a 
memorandum (Haslam memorandum) dated September 30, 1990, from 
Haslam to Gagliardi and Donlon, Vice President of Human 
Resources, about transferring some persons into CTS or 
terminating them in a RIF demonstrated age was a substantial 
factor in Unisys's decision to transfer them into and then 
terminate them from the CTS/PMO because the memorandum showed the 
ages of Armbruster Group members Kinard and Yanan.  The 
Armbruster Group also contended other Unisys personnel documents 
containing age information, some concerning the CTS/PMO transfer 
and RIF and others applying to Unisys employees generally, were 
overt evidence of discriminatory animus in the selection, 
transfer and RIF of individuals in the CTS/PMO. 
 The district court concluded these memoranda were not 
enough to show a Price Waterhouse case because references to age 
in a document concerning a personnel decision are not in and of 
themselves overt evidence of discriminatory animus based on age. 
The court noted that the Armbruster Group failed to introduce any 
evidence to support an inference that the age notations on the 
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documents showed Unisys had a mind to discriminate on the basis 
of age.  In fact, Unisys introduced evidence tending to show it 
routinely includes such age and ethnic information to prevent 
discrimination.  The Armbruster Group did not cite any legal 
authority in support of its theory that the mere appearance of 
age and date of birth information in a record concerning an 
employment decision permits an inference of intentional 
discrimination under Price Waterhouse.  Thus, the district court 
decided it should, as a matter of policy, reject the Armbruster 
Group's Price Waterhouse theory to avoid a perverse effect on a 
business's attempt to prevent discrimination through inclusion of 
information about its employees' age and race in its personnel 
records. 
 The court next considered whether the Armbruster 
Group's evidence established a pretext case.  Utilizing the 
burden-shifting analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the court assumed and 
Unisys stipulated that the Armbruster Group's evidence showed a 
prima facie case.0  The court then concluded Unisys's evidence 
established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for creating 
the CTS/PMO and later terminating the transferees, including the 
Armbruster Group.  Accordingly, it examined the evidence the 
                     
0Because 10 of the 12 persons ultimately retained in the CTS/PMO 
were over 40 years old, the court noted some uncertainty on 
whether the Armbruster Group met the fourth element of the 
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine prima facie case, i.e., that plaintiffs 
were replaced by unprotected, younger individuals. 
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Armbruster Group offered to show that Unisys's explanation was 
pretextual.  That evidence included the absence of any business 
plan to support a need for the CTS/PMO.  In this connection, the 
Armbruster Group argued it was highly unlikely that a 
sophisticated corporation like Unisys would take action to form 
the CTS/PMO without a business plan showing a need at the same 
time that it was drastically downsizing operations.  The district 
court decided the evidence indisputably refuted the Armbruster 
Group's theory that Unisys created the CTS/PMO for the sole 
purpose of terminating the transferees.  It said: 
[this] strains credulity.  Acceptance of 
plaintiffs' theory would effectively mean 
that [Unisys] received the willing 
cooperation of perhaps dozens of Unisys 
officials, to the point of having officers 
take promotional steps, such as asking CTS 
management around the country to identify 
opportunities for the new group, in laying 
off an additional thirty-five (35) employees. 
Since defendant had terminated thousands of 
employees in the wake of an unfortunate 
financial crisis, a reasonable jury would 
engage in impermissible speculation by 
inferring, as plaintiffs urge, that [Unisys] 
would expend the money, time, and effort 
needed to create and later dissolve a new 




Armbruster, 1993 WL 93975, at *13. 
 The court also considered a number of comments 
allegedly made by Unisys supervisors, including Wedean's 
statement that the Atlanta CTS/PMO transferees should be moved 
out of their offices quickly, Well's statement that he had been 
told to select his "senior people" for the CTS/PMO and human 
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resource staff member Weimer's remarks that the transferees 
"should have seen the writing on the wall" and his allegedly 
sarcastic statement "Gagliardi wouldn't do that, would he?"  The 
court concluded these statements, if made, were legally 
insufficient to allow an inference of pretext because they were 
merely stray remarks. 
 The court also rejected the Armbruster Group's theory 
that seniority, grade level and high salary were code words for 
age at Unisys and that Unisys's mention of them in documents 
concerning the CTS/PMO personnel decisions was evidence of 
pretext.  First, the court observed that the three criteria used 
in selecting candidates for the CTS/PMO did not include salary or 
grade level.  Second, it concluded that this theory was 
decisively contradicted by other evidence, including evidence 
that the oldest Armbruster Group member, Moritz, was earning the 
lowest salary of all the plaintiffs when he was terminated, while 
one of the youngest Armbruster Group members, Turner, was earning 
the highest salary.  The court also considered a memorandum from 
Donlon (Donlon memorandum), the Vice President of the Human 
Resources Department, suggesting subsequent RIFs would focus on 
high level, highly paid management employees "who have little or 
no impact on customer satisfaction or revenue attainment."  Id. 
The court rejected the Donlon memorandum as evidence of pretext 
because it did not specifically mention age or the CTS/PMO. 
 Finally, the Armbruster Group argued Unisys could not 
rely upon the cost savings resulting from termination of high 
salaried employees as a nondiscriminatory justification for 
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terminating employees in the protected age group.  The court 
determined the evidence did not support the Armbruster Group's 
argument that Unisys was motivated by their high salaries because 
the average salary of those retained was $3,200.00 higher than 
the average salary of those terminated.  In any event, the court 
reasoned that ADEA does not prohibit an employer in financial 
difficulties from considering costs in making personnel 
decisions.0 
 The district court therefore concluded the Armbruster 
Group failed to show a genuine disputed issue of material fact as 
to pretext because the evidence did not show that the reason 
Unisys gave for terminating members of the Armbruster Group was a 
pretext for discrimination.  Accordingly, it granted summary 
judgment to Unisys on the Armbruster Group's ADEA claim.  The 
district court also granted summary judgment to Unisys on the 
Armbruster Group's ERISA claim.  The Armbruster Group timely 
appealed the order granting summary judgment, but it does not 
pursue the ERISA claim on this appeal.  See supra n.2. 
 
IV.  Standard of Review 
 When reviewing an order granting summary judgment we 
exercise plenary review and apply the same test the district 
                     
0The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) filed a brief 
amicus curiae protesting the district court's "unfortunate use of 
. . . language" which AARP believes "create[ed] the false 
impression that under the ADEA cost-savings somehow justifies 
otherwise unlawful age discrimination."  Brief for Amicus at 4. 
This statement is dicta in the district court's opinion and, 
because we will reverse the district court for other reasons, we 
do not address this question. 
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court should have applied.  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(c) that test is whether there is a genuine issue of material 
fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 
F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992).  In so deciding, a court must 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
and draw all inferences in that party's favor.  Id.  There must, 
however, be sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in 
favor of the nonmoving party; if the evidence is merely colorable 
or not significantly probative, summary judgment should be 
granted.  Id.  "A disputed fact is 'material' if it would affect 
the outcome of the suit as determined by the substantive law." 




V.  "Mixed Motives" Analysis 
 We first consider whether the Armbruster Group's 
evidence presented a so-called "mixed motives" age discrimination 
case.0  The proof needed to establish a typical Price Waterhouse 
framework for a claim alleging discriminatory discharge has 
differed substantially from the framework in presenting a pretext 
case.  In a typical ADEA pretext case, the plaintiff can raise an 
inference of age discrimination by showing (1) he is within the 
protected age class, i.e. over forty; (2) he was qualified for 
the position at issue; (3) he was dismissed despite being 
qualified; and (4) he was replaced by a person sufficiently 
younger to permit an inference of age discrimination.  Burdine, 
450 U.S. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Gray, 957 
F.2d at 1078.  In RIF cases, this framework is inadequate with 
respect to the last factor.  To establish a prima facie case 
under the McDonnell-Douglas/Burdine pretext framework in a RIF 
case, the plaintiff must show he was in the protected class, he 
was qualified, he was laid off and other unprotected workers were 
retained.  Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., No. 93-3544, 1994 WL 
244883, at *3 (3d Cir. June 8, 1994); Billet v. Cigna Corp., 940 
F.2d 812, 816 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991); see also White v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 60 (3d Cir. 1988) (same), abrogated on 
other grounds, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 
                     
0Where appropriate, the analysis used in describing the 
evidentiary burdens in Title VII cases is also used in ADEA 
cases.  See, e.g., Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., No. 93-3544, at 
n.7 (3d Cir. June __, 1994); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel 
Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 
(1984). 
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(1993).0  Once a plaintiff with a claim for illegal 
discrimination produces evidence showing these four facts, he has 
made out a prima facie case under the pretext framework and the 
defendant then has to proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment decision. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
253; Gray, 957 F.2d at 1078.  If the defendant presents evidence 
of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment decision, the presumption of discrimination drops from 
the case and the plaintiff must offer evidence tending to show 
the defendant's explanation is a pretext for discrimination.  
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 257; Gray, 957 F.2d at 1078.  In an 
ADEA case within the pretext framework, the plaintiff has 
retained the burden of persuading the factfinder that age 
actually played a role in the adverse employment decision and had 
a determinative influence on the outcome.0 Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 
                     
0In Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 
1993), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
recently held that a plaintiff in a RIF case seeking to establish 
a prima facie case has to show (1) he was protected by the ADEA; 
(2) he was selected for discharge from a larger group of 
candidates; (3) his work performance was comparable to the lowest 
level of those retained; and (4) the RIF produced a work force 
containing some unprotected individuals whose work performance 
was lower than the plaintiff's.  The court reasoned such a prima 
facie requirement would zero in on age discrimination where the 
selection of persons to be terminated is said to be based on 
relative performance.  Id. 
0Unisys argues Griffiths v. Cigna Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 472 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) requires a plaintiff in a pretext 
case to show "the discriminatory motive was the sole cause of the 
employment action."  In Miller v. Cigna Corp., No. 93-1773, 1994 
WL 283269 (3d Cir. June 28, 1994), in distinguishing Griffiths 
and in commenting on its statement that illegal discrimination 
must be the "sole cause" of an employer's decision in a pretext 
case, we held, in light of St. Mary's, that in a pretext case 
"the plaintiff's burden is to show that the prohibited 
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1706; see St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2748 (plaintiff retains 
burden of showing discrimination was true reason for employment 
decision). 
 By contrast, in the Price Waterhouse framework in a 
case unaffected by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the evidence the 
plaintiff produces is so revealing of discriminatory animus that 
it is not necessary to rely on any presumption from the prima 
facie case to shift the burden of production.  Both the burden of 
production and the risk of non-persuasion are shifted to the 
defendant who, because of the inference the overt evidence 
showing the employee's bias permits, must persuade the factfinder 
that even if discrimination was a motivating factor in the 
adverse employment decision, it would have made the same 
employment decision regardless of its discriminatory animus. 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-46; Griffiths v. Cigna Corp., 
988 F.2d 457, 469-70 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 The evidence required to establish a Price Waterhouse 
case was termed "direct" evidence by Justice O'Connor in her 
concurrence with the Price Waterhouse plurality where she said: 
[S]tray remarks in the workplace, while 
perhaps probative of sexual harassment, 
cannot justify requiring the employer to 
prove that its hiring or promotion decisions 
were based on legitimate criteria.  Nor can 
statements by nondecisionmakers, or 
statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the 
decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy 
the plaintiff's burden in this regard. . . . 
What is required is . . . direct evidence 
                                                                  
consideration played a role in the decisionmaking process and 
that it was a determinative factor in the outcome of that 
process."  Id. at *12 (footnote omitted). 
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that decisionmakers placed substantial 
negative reliance on an illegitimate 
criterion in reaching their decision. 
 
 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted).  We have said that the evidence required to 
come within the Price Waterhouse framework must directly reflect 
a discriminatory or retaliatory animus on the part of a person 
involved in the decisionmaking process.  Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 
470; see Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 181-
82 (2d Cir. 1992) (ADEA case suggesting word "direct" may not be 
a precisely accurate modifier, but plainly differentiating the 
evidence the Price Waterhouse framework requires from the kind of 
circumstantial evidence needed to make out a McDonnell-
Douglas/Burdine prima facie case).  Once the plaintiff has 
produced evidence that satisfies Price Waterhouse, as we have 
stated, the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion 
shift to the defendant to introduce evidence showing the 
defendant would have made the same adverse employment decision 
regardless of the discrimination.  Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 469-
70.0 
 In this case the district court considered whether the 
remarks shown on this record were "direct" evidence of 
intentional discrimination.  It focused on Markell's "fifty and 
                     
0Under section 107(a) of the 1991 Act, the defendant may no 
longer be able to completely escape liability, as he could under 
Price Waterhouse, by showing he would have made the same decision 
regardless of consideration of the discriminatory factor, but he 
can limit the plaintiff's remedies if he makes such a showing.  
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2) (West Supp. 1994); see also supra 
n.3. 
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fifty" comment and the documents containing information about the 
age and date of birth of the persons selected for transfer.  It 
held that this evidence failed to show discriminatory animus 
within the Price Waterhouse framework.  We agree with the 
district court that this evidence does not satisfy Price 
Waterhouse, whether we label it as direct evidence or overt 
evidence of discriminatory animus. 
 The district court first considered the "fifty and 
fifty" statement Markell is alleged to have made during an 
April 19, 1990, Unisys meeting to discuss labor costs that had 
been scheduled several months before Gagliardi began creating the 
CTS/PMO.0  Markell resigned from Unisys in August of 1990, at 
least three months before the CTS/PMO transfers took place.  He 
testified he had no connection with employment decisions 
regarding the CTS/PMO.  Although Markell worked for Gagliardi and 
was a decisionmaker with respect to the hiring and firing of 
Unisys employees and he and Gagliardi had "lots" of contact 
regarding downsizing at Unisys, Jt. App. at A-695, there is no 
evidence connecting the "fifty and fifty" statement to Gagliardi 
or any other CTS/PMO decisionmaker.  Indeed, Markell testified he 
could not remember Gagliardi making any age-related comments, 
although he recalled that Gagliardi frequently commented on 
employee positions in the Unisys corporate hierarchy, often in 
derogatory terms.  Markell's alleged statement is not 
                     
0During his deposition Markell did not recall this meeting nor 
did he recall making specific statements about people over the 
age of 50 making over $50,000 in salary, but he admitted he may 
have made general statements about levels and salaries. 
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attributable to a decisionmaker connected with the CTS/PMO 
employment decisions and is too remote in time from the creation 
of the CTS/PMO to constitute overt evidence sufficient to show 
Unisys had a discriminatory animus towards older employees.0 See 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf. 
Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545, 
523 (3d Cir. 1992) (law firm partner's discriminatory comment to 
associate five years before partnership decision at issue too 
temporally remote and isolated to be considered evidence of 
discrimination in pretext case), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 
(1993).  "Stray remarks by non-decisionmakers or by 
decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given 
great weight, particularly if they were made temporally remote 
from the date of decision."  Ezold, 983 F.2d at 545.  Thus, the 
district court correctly determined Markell's statement did not 
constitute overt evidence of discriminatory animus.0 
                     
0In its district court brief opposing Unisys's motion for summary 
judgment, the Armbruster Group also relied on an alleged 
statement Perry, President of Unisys's Public Division Sector, 
made in late 1988 during a meeting to discuss whether to create a 
customer satisfaction director in each region of the Public 
Sector group.  Perry allegedly stated at the meeting "I'm going 
to establish the position, but I don't want any over 50 burnouts 
promoted."  Armbruster, 1993 WL 93975, at *9.  This alleged 
statement was made more than two years before the creation of the 
CTS/PMO, and there is no evidence linking it to Unisys's 
employment decisions about the CTS/PMO.  In any event, the 
Armbruster Group has not pursued this argument on appeal. 
0The district court also correctly concluded this particular 
statement was inadmissible hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(D) and 805.  Markell never identified who gave him the 
impression Unisys did not want to keep employees "over 50 and 
50."  Markell also testified that Gagliardi, to whom the 
Armbruster Group tries to attribute Markell's statement, never 
made any statements concerning employees' ages.  Therefore, 
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 The Armbruster Group's argument that several Unisys 
documents containing age notations, birth dates and/or dates of 
hire constitute evidence of discriminatory animus sufficient to 
trigger Price Waterhouse also fails.  First they refer to the 
memorandum dated September 30, 1990 from Haslam, chief Human 
Resources representative for the CTS/PMO, to Gagliardi and 
Donlon, Vice President of Human Resources, with a copy to Weimer. 
The Haslam memorandum discusses the need either to transfer or 
RIF thirteen individuals, including Armbruster Group members 
Yanan and Kinard.  Only five of the thirteen listed individuals, 
including Yanan and Kinard, have age and date of hire notations 
handwritten next to their names.  At the bottom of the memorandum 
Haslam's summary notes state, "need final disposition on [Yanan 
and Kinard] . . . [Gagliardi] will assist in [Yanan] . . . these 
loose ends need to be resolved to finalize the CSD-CTS action." 
Jt. App. at A-19.  None of the remaining individuals, all of whom 
were to be retained, had age or date of hire information written 
next to their names. 
                                                                  
Markell's statement is inadmissible double hearsay under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 805.  See Carden v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
850 F.2d 996, 1002 (3d Cir. 1988).  Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of 
North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1262 (1993) is distinguishable.  In Big Apple 
BMW, the source of the discriminatory comment was identifiable 
and therefore admissible as an admission under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(D).  Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715 (3d 
Cir. 1988), another case relied on by the Armbruster Group, is 
also distinguishable because the discriminatory statements there 
came from the president of the university who had a "significant 
influence on the attitudes and procedures of the tenure 
decisionmakers."  Id. at 733.  There is no evidence in the record 
showing that Markell was in a similar position here. 
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 Another document dated November 9, 1990, is a printed 
list entitled "Project Manager List - Atlanta."  Jt. App. at A-
21.  The list includes the names of nineteen individuals and the 
dates of birth, ages, sex, EEO classifications and performance 
evaluations for all of them.  A handwritten version of this list, 
created on November 6, 1990, by N. Kenneth Clark, Human Resources 
Manager in Atlanta, contains the same information for all but 
three individuals not included on the typed list. 
 The Armbruster Group argues that these documents 
containing age notations are overt evidence of discriminatory 
animus that satisfies Price Waterhouse and defeats a summary 
judgment motion.  Unisys, however, has produced uncontradicted 
evidence that its employees routinely prepared documents listing 
employees' ages, dates of hire, race and sex in addition to other 
employment information and it insists that its employees include 
this information to prevent discrimination, especially during 
RIFs.  Unisys also argues that the Haslam memorandum and Kinard's 
own deposition testimony reveal Kinard and Yanan were scheduled 
for a RIF termination in October of 1990 but were "saved" from 
the October RIF through Haslam's efforts and transferred into the 
CTS/PMO instead.  The Armbruster Group concedes that companies 
may avoid discrimination by having their legal and human resource 
staff use routine employment documents containing age information 
but argues that in this case Unisys managers clearly used age 
information to make transfer and termination decisions. 
 The district court rejected the Armbruster Group's 
interpretation of the documents and instead accepted Unisys's 
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interpretation, which it supported with independent evidence, 
primarily in the form of testimony by its own employees.  We must 
consider whether these documents, standing alone, are overt 
evidence of age discriminatory animus at Unisys in relation to 
the CTS/PMO. 
 The three cases the district court relied on to support 
its conclusion that mere maintenance of age information for 
employees is not enough to create an inference of intentional 
discrimination are not much help in this analysis.  In them, the 
documents containing age notations did not relate to a RIF but 
instead involved a calculation of the terminated employee's 
severance pay or retirement benefits package.  A termination 
resulting from an age correlated factor is not a termination 
because of age.  See Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1707 (overruling White 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1988) on this 
point). 
 In Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510 
(6th Cir. 1991), the employer decided to eliminate an employee's 
position in the course of a RIF.  Id. at 512.  The employer gave 
the employee four choices, one of which was taking an early 
retirement package.  Id. at 513.  The memorandum at issue was 
developed by the employee's supervisor before the employee's 
termination in order to compute what kind of severance package 
the employer could offer the employee if he took the early 
retirement package.  Id. at 514.  The court found no indication 
in the memorandum that the employee's years of service, which 
were noted in the memorandum as part of the computation regarding 
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severance pay, played any part in his inclusion in the RIF.  Id. 
The court also held personnel documents showing employees' 
birthdates and years of service were not overt evidence of 
discriminatory animus, stating "the mere maintenance of such 
information, absent direct evidence that it was used in making 
adverse employment decisions, cannot create even a circumstantial 
inference of discrimination."  Id.  Likewise, in Perry v. 
Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 843 (D.N.J. 
1989), aff'd without opinion, 904 F.2d 696 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 386 (1990), the court decided the age 
notations in the document at issue were included to determine how 
the employee's pension would be funded and were not evidence of 
age discrimination.  Id. at 853.  Bowman v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 724 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ohio 1989), did not involve a 
RIF.  The documents at issue, "Age Data Forms" containing name, 
address, date of birth, occupation and pay information, were 
required to be maintained by the federal Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission and were used daily in management 
decisions.  Id. at 506. 
 Here, though the documents the Armbruster Group rely on 
pertain to the individuals Unisys was transferring into the 
CTS/PMO, we believe that they do not provide overt evidence of 
discriminatory animus because none of them directly and 
unequivocally indicate Unisys had a bias against older employees 
from which a factfinder could directly infer that age was a 
motivating factor in deciding who would be transferred into and 
then terminated from the CTS/PMO.   Indeed, it is not even 
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clearly shown that all of the documents are related to the 
CTS/PMO transfers. 
 In addition, we agree with the district court that 
"[h]aving accurate information pertaining to the age of employees 
affected by a workforce restructuring readily available is 
essential to allow employers properly to review their employment 
decisions to comply with state and federal law."  Armbruster, 
1993 WL 93975, at *11 (citing Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 
F.2d 1077, 1082  (11th Cir. 1990) ("Evaluations of the age of the 
work force as part of a restructuring and reduction-in-force plan 
are indicative of thorough business planning and are not direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent.").  Rarely will standard 
employment documents, without more, constitute direct evidence of 
intentional discrimination.  See E.E.O.C. v. MCI Int'l, Inc., 829 
F. Supp. 1438, 1447 (D.N.J. 1993) ("Documents which list 
employees' ages, even documents which relate to a [RIF], are not 
per se direct evidence of discrimination and may, indeed, be 
innocuous.  A document prepared . . . expressly for the purpose 
of determining [RIF candidates] with consideration given to the 
employees' proximity to retirement, however, is not so innocuous 
. . . .") (citations omitted). 
 We will therefore affirm that part of the district 
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Unisys on the 
Armbruster Group's claim that the evidence in this record 
presents a Price Waterhouse case.0  Nevertheless, we think the 
                     
0We do not mean to suggest that an employee must elect to proceed 
on either a pretext or a Price Waterhouse theory at trial.  
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documents presented in this case contain age notations that may 
be related to the adverse employment decision; therefore they may 
be introduced as evidence of pretext, so long as they are 
otherwise admissible.  See Wilson, 932 F.2d at 514; see also In 
re Interco Inc., 152 B.R. 273, 285 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (statistical 
evidence coupled with handwritten document containing notations 
about age of employees who were to be part of RIF sufficed to 
establish prima facie pretext case of age discrimination).0 
VI.  Pretext Analysis 
 In Hazen, a case decided after Price Waterhouse, 
Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, stated an ADEA 
                                                                  
Rather, we think that an employee may present his case under both 
theories and the district court must then decide whether one or 
both theories properly apply at some point in the proceedings 
prior to instructing the jury.  See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 
U.S. at 247 n.12; id. at 278 (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 472; see also Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 185.  
While the evidence here presented to us at the summary judgment 
stage does not trigger the Price Waterhouse framework, the 
evidence presented during trial may. 
0We note the district court in the Atlanta CTS/PMO litigation was 
"unpersuaded that the fact that age was included on lists of 
employee information is relevant circumstantial or direct 
evidence of discrimination."  Meeker, No. 1:92-cv-246-ODE, slip 
op. at 21 n.12.  It is not clear, however, that the Meeker court 
had before it the same documentary evidence we have because that 
court identifies the documentary evidence only as the Staff 
Adjustment Analysis and "two other lists of employees [which] 
include age or date of birth in addition to other information." 
Id. at 14.  The Meeker employees relied primarily on Markell's 
testimony along with statistical evidence tending to show a 
correlation between age and the likelihood of transfer into the 
Atlanta CTS/PMO.  Id. at 12, 14.  The Meeker employees also 
conceded that they had no overt evidence of discriminatory animus 
that could trigger the Price Waterhouse framework.  Id. at 11. 
The Meeker court ultimately concluded plaintiffs established a 
prima facie case of age discrimination but failed to present 
sufficient evidence of pretext and thus granted summary judgment 
to Unisys.  Id. at 26. 
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disparate treatment claim "cannot succeed unless the employee's 
protected trait actually played a role and had a determinative 
influence on the outcome."  Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1706.  The type 
of evidence required in a pretext case is not overt or 
"[e]xplicit evidence of discrimination--i.e., the 'smoking gun,'" 
as it is in a Price Waterhouse case.  Ezold, 983 F.2d at 523; see 
also Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 470.  Rather, what is required has 
been termed "circumstantial" evidence by the courts, or 
"'competent evidence that the presumptively valid reason[] for 
[the alleged unlawful employment action] [was] in fact a coverup 
for a . . . discriminatory decision.'"  Id. (quoting McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805).  Thus, we turn to the question whether 
the Armbruster Group has pointed to specific evidence that shows 
there is a genuine issue of material fact on pretext. 
 In order to survive a summary judgment motion once the 
defendant has produced evidence of a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for an employment decision, a plaintiff 
who claims invidious discrimination but lacks overt evidence of 
discriminatory animus must point to evidence tending to show the 
defendant's explanation is pretextual since the inference arising 
from a prima facie case no longer exists.  St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. 
at 2749.0  "A plaintiff can establish pretext in one of two ways: 
                     
0The Supreme Court's opinion in St. Mary's has caused courts and 
commentators to raise anew the question whether summary judgment 
may be granted against a plaintiff who has established a prima 
facie pretext case.  See St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2747-49. 
 
    The two courts that our research shows have decided this 
issue reached opposite conclusions.  Moisi v. College of Sequoias 
Community College Dist., 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 
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'either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory 
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by 
showing that the employer's proffered reason is unworthy of 
credence.'"  Ezold, 983 F.2d at 523 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
256).  The evidence of sham or pretext that Burdine requires the 
plaintiff to produce does not have to show directly or overtly 
that a discriminatory animus caused the adverse employment 
decision, but the plaintiff must point to some evidence from 
which pretext could be inferred.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
St. Mary's, "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of [the defendant's 
                                                                  
5th Dist. 1993) decided that St. Mary's precludes summary 
judgment in pretext cases because of the statement that the 
credibility assessment of the employer's proffered reasons is for 
the trier of fact.  Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 783 
(W.D. Okla. 1993) rejects this reading of St. Mary's.  It states 
St. Mary's language implies only that a factfinder's refusal to 
believe a defendant's proffer, combined with a prima facie case, 
permits an inference of discrimination.  The plaintiff still 
bears the burden of producing evidence to show a controversy over 
the truth of defendant's explanation.  Id. at 791-92. 
 
    The Bolton court decided that St. Mary's does not preclude 
summary judgment for a defendant because it does not affect a 
plaintiff's obligation to produce specific evidence in support of 
the ultimate finding of illegal discrimination once the defendant 
has offered a legitimate explanation for the allegedly 
discriminatory act.  The Bolton court also reasoned that there is 
nothing in St. Mary's which specifically states the use of 
summary judgment in discrimination cases is disfavored and that 
giving St. Mary's such an interpretation would allow a plaintiff 
to get his case to the factfinder without producing any evidence 
of discrimination beyond what is necessary to establish a generic 
prima facie case.  Id. at 792.  The Bolton court explained: "Such 
a standard as the court adopts in Moisi would be much lower than 
the one used for civil plaintiffs in other areas of the law and 
would be unsupported by case law from either the Supreme Court or 
the federal courts of appeal."  Id. at 791-92.  We too decline to 
read St. Mary's as precluding summary judgment in all 
discrimination cases in which the plaintiff has made out a prima 
facie case. 
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explanation] may, together with the elements of the prima facie 
case, suffice to show intentional discrimination" because it 
allows the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of 
intentional discrimination.  St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. 
After St. Mary's it seems clear, however, that the trier of fact 
cannot find for the plaintiff merely because it disbelieves the 
defendant's proffered explanation; it must also be persuaded that 
the employment decision was the result of the bias that can be 
inferred from the falsity of the defendant's explanation.  Id.; 
see Seman, 1994 WL 244883, at *10 n.13.  Therefore, we believe an 
ultimate finding of illegal discrimination in a pretext case 
requires evidence showing a prima facie case and evidence showing 
pretext.  Each is necessary, and a plaintiff's proof is 
insufficient unless both are shown. 
 Considering the evidence in this record, we believe the 
Armbruster Group has met its summary judgment burden of pointing 
to admissible evidence which tends to show pretext.  That 
evidence includes the alleged comments made by Wedean, Wells and 
Weimer, along with the specific documents containing age 
notations concerning transfers into and terminations from the 
CTS/PMO group.  Taken together, we think this is competent 
evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
the Armbruster Group's transfers into and terminations from the 
CTS/PMO were age-related.  Wedean, Wells and Weimer were all 
either decisionmakers or personnel immediately involved in the 
transfers into and/or terminations from the CTS/PMO.  Their 
alleged comments were made contemporaneously with the transfer 
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into the CTS/PMO or within a few weeks after the RIF took effect. 
While we do not think that these comments are enough to show an 
overtly discriminatory mind set at Unisys, they cannot be 
disposed of as "stray remarks" on a pretext theory, and we think 
that the district court erred in applying Price Waterhouse's 
requirement of overt or direct evidence of discriminatory animus 
to the Armbruster Group's pretext case.0 
 If the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable 
to the Armbruster Group, as it should have been on summary 
judgment, it supports their claim of age discrimination because 
the evidence of remarks and age notations with specific reference 
to the age of persons selected for transfer tends to show 
Unisys's reasons for terminating the CTS/PMO transferees were 
pretextual, i.e. more likely motivated by illegal discrimination, 
when they are considered along with the Armbruster Group's other 
evidence of discrimination.  This other evidence includes, but is 
not limited to, evidence that Unisys had no business plan for the 
formation of the CTS/PMO and the manner in which the CTS/PMO was 
formed and operated.  Taken with the admissible comments 
concerning age that were made by persons intimately involved in 
the transfers, we think there is a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether the Armbruster Group's members were transferred or 
                     
0We think these statements by Wedean, Wells and Weimer are 
admissions that fall under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)'s 
exception to the hearsay rule.  They are not double hearsay like 
Markell's recital of what Gagliardi said.  See Carden, 850 F.2d 
at 1002; see also supra n.17. 
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terminated because of their age.0  Therefore, we will reverse the 
district court's order granting summary judgment to Unisys and 
remand for further proceedings.0 
                     
0The district court found the Armbruster Group's theory of the 
case "strains credulity."  Armbruster, 1993 WL 93975, at *13. It 
thought it unlikely that Unisys would go to such trouble to 
terminate approximately 35 employees while it was in the midst of 
terminating thousands.  Because plaintiffs have pointed to 
evidence which supports their theory and is not inherently 
incredible, it is not our place, nor the district court's, to 
make such a credibility determination on a motion for summary 
judgment.  "When deciding a motion for summary judgment . . . a 
court's role remains circumscribed in that it is inappropriate 
for a court to resolve factual disputes and to make credibility 
determinations."  Big Apple, 974 F.2d at 1363.  The Court's role 
is to decide whether the plaintiff has set forth specific facts 
showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial.  Id.  We 
think the Armbruster Group has produced evidence of pretext 
sufficient to do so at the present stage of these proceedings. 
 
    We also note that the district court did not consider the 
allegedly discriminatory statements, the Haslam memorandum or the 
other CTS/PMO documents containing age references in determining 
whether the Armbruster Group presented evidence sufficient to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment in a pretext case.  So 
long as these pieces of evidence are otherwise admissible, they 
should be considered as part of the Armbruster Group's pretext 
case at trial. 
 
    Likewise, the Armbruster Group's evidence may be relevant to 
show Unisys's explanation for their selection for and termination 
from the CTS/PMO was pretextual.  Further development of this 
record, however, may show that the references to employees "over 
50 and 50" indicates no more than Unisys's desire to reduce its 
pension costs.  See, e.g., Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1707 (holding 
employer does not violate ADEA by firing employee before his 
pension based on years of service vested, but leaving open 
possibility that employer who targets employees with particular 
status on assumption that these employees are likely to be older 
thereby engages in age discrimination). 
0Because the district court, despite misgivings, permitted the 
parties to proceed on a stipulation that plaintiffs have shown a 
prima facie case and the existence of a prima facie case is also 
assumed in their appellate briefing, we have considered only the 
question whether the Armbruster Group has introduced evidence 
showing Unisys's proffered explanation for the termination of its 
37 
 The Armbruster Group also contends that Unisys 
discriminated against them when it selected them for transfer 
into and termination from the CTS/PMO group.  In its opinion, the 
district court addressed only the Armbruster Group's termination 
from the CTS/PMO.  On remand we think the district court may also 
need to consider the evidence in this record concerning the 
Armbruster Group's selection for transfer into the CTS/PMO.  It 
may also be of some significance that the SMG group apparently 
remained separate from the CTS/PMO transferees at all times. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 We will affirm in part the order of the district court 
granting summary judgment as to the Armbruster Group's ERISA 
claim, vacate the order granting summary judgment on the 
Armbruster Group's ADEA claim and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 




                                                                  
members was either likely motivated by discrimination or unworthy 
of belief and that discrimination was the true reason for such 
action.  We do not reach the issue of whether the Armbruster 
Group established a proper prima facie case.  But see Maxfield v. 
Sinclair, 766 F.2d 788, 792-93 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 1057 (1986). 
